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Gaining, maintaining and repairing organisational legitimacy: when to report and when 
not to report 
ABSTRACT    
 
Purpose 
This paper examines how legitimacy is gained, maintained or repaired through direct action with 
salient stakeholders and/or through external reporting using a number of empirical case vignettes 
within a single case study organisation.  
 
Design and methodology 
The study investigates a foreign affiliate of a large multinational organisation involved in an 
environmentally sensitive industry. Data collection included semi-structured interviews with 26 
participants, organisational reports, and participation in the organisation’s annual 
environmental management seminar and a stakeholder engagement meeting. 
 
Findings 
Four vignettes featuring environmental issues illustrate the complexity of organisational 
responses. Issue visibility, stakeholder salience and stakeholder interconnectedness influence 
company action to manage legitimacy. In the short-term, environmental issues which affected 
salient stakeholders resulted in swift and direct action to protect pragmatic legitimacy, but 
external reporting did not feature in legitimacy management efforts. Highly visible issues to the 
public, regulators and the media, however, resulted in action together with external reporting to 
manage wider stakeholder perceptions. External reporting was used superficially, along with a 
broad suite of communication strategies, to gain legitimacy in the long-term decision about the 
company’s future in New Zealand.  
 
Research implications 
This paper outlines how episodic encounters to manage strategic legitimacy with salient 
stakeholders in the short-term are theoretically distinct, but nonetheless linked to continual 
efforts to maintain institutional legitimacy. Case vignettes highlight how pragmatic legitimacy 
via dispositional legitimacy can be managed with direct action in the short-term to influence a 
limited range of salient stakeholders. The way external reporting features in legitimacy 
management is limited, although this has predominantly been the focus of prior research. Only 
where an environmental incident damages legitimacy to a larger number of stakeholders is 
external reporting also used to buttress community support.  
 
Originality/value 
The concept of legitimacy is comprehensively applied, linking the strategic and institutional arms 
of legitimacy and illustrating how episodic actions are taken to manage legitimacy in the short-
term with continual efforts to manage legitimacy in the long-term. Stakeholder salience and 
networks are brought in as novel theoretical extensions to provide a deeper understanding of the 
interrelationships between these key concepts with a unique case study.  
 
Keywords 




The purpose of this paper is to examine how a company responds to environmental issues and 
legitimacy threats through direct actions and/or external reporting. The present study takes a 
fresh perspective, by exploring the behaviour of a company in response to real environmental 
issues uncovered during the case study investigation. It illustrates how direct action and/or 
external reporting are strategic choices to manage organisational legitimacy in response to 
stakeholder salience. A large company in New Zealand operating in an environmentally sensitive 
industry forms the case study context.  
 
Legitimacy theory as a framework to understand external organisation reporting behaviour is 
extensive in the social and environmental accounting literature (Deegan, 2002; 2014). Suchman 
(1995) introduced two broad strands of legitimacy theory involving strategic and institutional 
approaches. Our study brings these strands together, illustrating the way that a company can 
strategically manage its response behaviours to achieve a more institutionally defined sense of 
legitimacy. This advances perspectives into understanding “strategic and institutional aspects of 
legitimacy theory as two sides of the same coin” (Mobus, 2005 p. 511; see also Dumay et al., 
2015). Our case study of ‘debated’ legitimacy status (Deephouse et al., 2017), explores how 
navigating pragmatic legitimacy concerns of salient stakeholders through direct actions in the 
short-term can help maintain organisational legitimacy in the long-term. Consequently, this study 
extends Suchman’s (1995) framework by discussing the linkages between more short-term 
(episodic) efforts to manage strategic legitimacy which then establish a long-term (continual) 
sense of institutional legitimacy in conforming to social norms, customs and behaviours (Deegan, 
2002).  
 
The present paper finds that legitimating actions relate to much more subtle and direct displays 
to appease specific target audiences, and these actions may never be reported to a wider 
audience. Four vignettes from the case company’s operations are presented to illustrate how 
response behavior is modulated by the need to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy. The first three 
present short-term issues, and only in the third of these, which is an exceptional circumstance, is 
external reporting used in an effort to symbolically repair wider legitimacy concerns as a more 
diverse and dispersed set of stakeholders is affected. Similarly, external reporting is also an 
important feature of the company maintaining its overarching legitimacy in the fourth vignette. 
This last vignette illustrates the lead up to a large operational (and inherently environmental) 
decision about its long-term future in New Zealand where a broader range of stakeholders are 
also affected. Here, symbolic disclosures are deployed to gain legitimacy as the company 
transitions into a new phase of operations. 
 
Ultimately, the present study provides a number of contributions to the literature. First, it adds to 
research which explores internal firm behaviour which leads up to external reporting in both 
short-term and long-term environmental issues. Second, while there has been consideration of 
the role of external reporting in managing legitimacy (see, for example, O’Donovan, 2002; 
Conway et al., 2015; Belal and Owen, 2015), this study is novel in its comprehensive exploration 
of pragmatic, moral and cognitive elements of legitimacy through both action as well as external 
reporting. Third, the present paper extends prior work that focuses on either the institutional or 
strategic arms of legitimacy theory but rarely considers the interrelationships between both (but 
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see Dumay et al., 2015). It discusses how episodic and strategic attempts to manage legitimacy 
relate to the continual and institutional dimensions legitimacy. We show how a nuanced and 
multi-faceted application of legitimacy theory (Suchman, 1995) can produce stronger insights 
into firm response behaviour, thus developing a continued role for legitimacy theory as an 
explanatory lens. Fourth, by integrating elements of stakeholder salience with legitimacy theory, 
we provide further insights into when action versus external reporting is a preferred response to 
managing environmental issues across a range of decision-making horizons.  
 
A review of the relevant literature is presented in the next section. Section three provides the 
conceptual framework we adopt based on organisational legitimacy and stakeholder salience. 
Section four reports our methods. Section five presents the case context and field sites 
investigated. The findings and analysis are presented in section six. Sections seven and eight 
discuss and summarise the insights from the internal behaviours related to action and external 
reporting.  
2. Social and environmental reporting and decision-making 
Unerman and Chapman (2014; see also Brown and Fraser, 2006) argue that an important element 
of research is “maintaining an openness to review and update theoretical frameworks in use, and 
to develop novel theoretical framings, if evidence and understandings from new studies are to 
make ongoing and substantive contributions to evaluating, critiquing and developing policy and 
practice” (p. 386). In doing so, we suggest they highlight an important role for in-depth 
explorations of the organisational behaviours which underpin external reporting.  
 
The symbolic adoption of external reporting and concerns over its lack of accountability are well 
established (e.g. Michelon et al., 2015; Higgins et al., 2015; Buhr et al., 2014). As Guthrie and 
Abeysekera (2006, p.115; see also Belal and Cooper, 2011) note, “…what organizations choose 
to include in (and omit from) their annual reports is a conscious decision that communicates a 
significant message to stakeholders”. Legitimacy theory is often used to explain the decoupling 
of internal practice from the perceived symbolic and instrumental use of external reporting (e.g. 
Brown and Deegan, 1998; Cho et al., 2015; Tilling and Tilt, 2010; Deegan, 2014). Legitimacy 
theory is posited to explain increased voluntary social and environmental accounting disclosure 
when firms need to maintain or repair legitimacy, often due to adverse incidents. Yet Tilling and 
Tilt (2010) find that when an organisation is in a ‘legitimacy loss’ phase, external disclosure may 
not be perceived by management as an important communication tool (see also de Villiers and 
Van Staden, 2006). Strategic attempts by management to manipulate legitimacy, then, may well 
vary according to the institutional legitimacy phases that an organisation faces, fundamentally 
affecting the nature and form of its response behaviour (O’Donovan, 2002).  
 
Due to the considerable focus on reports as the phenomena of study (Belal and Owen, 2015), the 
internal behaviours and decision-making processes which lead up to the strategic external release 
of reported information have been less studied or theorised. Simply asserting legitimacy 
explanations for externally reported information does not inform their strategic precursors. 
Theoretical diversity and more practice-engaged work is called for (Parker, 2014; Unerman and 




We acknowledge that some work has sought to explore external social and environmental 
reporting from the ‘inside-out’. Attention has been directed to internal firm processes which 
underlie decisions to begin voluntary external reporting, and the management systems put in place 
to generate reports (e.g. Hahn and Kühnen, 2013; Adams and Larrinaga-Gonzales, 2007; Adams 
and Frost, 2008). Such work is arguably driven by the need to: 
enhance our understanding of the more nuanced and complex ways in which decisions 
relating to corporate social responsibilities, environmental pressures, legitimacy threats, 
stakeholder power and engagements, risk management and reputations are taken (Bebbington 
and Thomson, 2013 p. 279).  
Nonetheless, the extent to which internal strategic decision-making and reporting practices in 
social and environmental accounting are linked remains under-explored (Maas et al., 2016). Most 
literature on internal organisational processes focuses on control systems; broadly concerning 
management control systems, environmental management systems and business strategy. Better 
integration of management control systems [MCS] and environmental management systems 
[EMS] has been suggested to improve transparency and engagement with stakeholders (Garcia et 
al., 2016). Other studies explain how firms implement sustainability strategy by collecting 
information to strengthen risk management processes, innovation and communication (e.g. 
Arjalies and Mundy, 2013). Certain configurations of control systems enable greater integration 
of sustainability into organisational strategy and culture (Gond et al., 2012). In these studies, 
internal management of company processes is considered to contribute to societal goals (Arjalies 
and Mundy, 2013).  
 
Much less understood, however, especially from a managerial perspective, is the direct action 
and/or external reporting responses to environmental incidents and legitimacy threats in short and 
long-term issues, and how these are related or linked. The next section introduces these elements 
and our conceptual framework.  
 
3. Legitimacy and stakeholder relationships 
3.1 Legitimacy 
Suchman (1995) condenses the diverse literature on organisational legitimacy into 1) strategic 
approaches and 2) institutional approaches [3]. The strategic approach emphasises legitimacy as 
an operational resource instrumentally managed by organisations. Institutional legitimacy 
emphasises the power of external, cultural and contextual factors in constructing organisations 
and the standards by which they are judged. Each strand is further divided into pragmatic, moral 
and cognitive terms.  
 
Pragmatic legitimacy deals with self-interested evaluations of an organisation by external 
stakeholders (Suchman, 1995, p. 571). Pragmatic legitimacy can arise from exchange legitimacy 
(where the expected value of an organisation’s activities is what ultimately determines its 
legitimacy), influence legitimacy (where external stakeholders believe they can shape the 
organisation) and dispositional legitimacy (the ‘good’ character of organisations and the belief 




Moral legitimacy, on the other hand, concerns ‘normative approval’ based on whether an 
organisation’s behaviour is right or wrong.  Pragmatic and moral legitimacy rest on 
‘discursive’ evaluations (Suchman, 1995 p. 585), which can be in the form of engagement 
through action or dialogue, whereas cognitive legitimacy moves beyond discursive evaluations 
to achieving a ‘taken-for-grantedness’ that essentially makes the organisation unquestionable and 
hides it in plain sight (Suchman, 1995 p. 571).  
 
Deephouse et al. (2017, p.33) add to these insights suggesting the need for acknowledgement of 
different states of organisational legitimacy. ‘Accepted’ organisations reflect the ‘taken-for-
granted’ nature that Suchman (1995) describes and these organisations are not subjected to 
scrutiny. ‘Proper’ organisations have been subjected to recent evaluation and have been 
determined to be acceptable. However, the legitimacy of such organisations is less secure than if 
they had passive, taken-for-granted acceptance. ‘Debated’ legitimacy reflects a situation where 
different stakeholders may have divergent opinions and challenge the values and activities of an 
organisation (Deephouse et al., 2017). The final category consists of ‘illegitimate’ organisations 
which have essentially lost their license to operate.  
 
Tilling and Tilt (2010) discuss six phases of legitimation, drawing on the work of Ashforth and 
Gibbs (1990) and Suchman (1995). These phases range from the establishment, maintenance, 
extension, and defence, to loss and disestablishment of legitimacy. Tilling and Tilt (2010) argue 
that these phases refer to broader institutional arrangements of legitimacy, although they also 
discuss the ways that strategic management behaviour may respond to different pressures in each 
phase. As O’Donovan (2002, p. 349) notes, then, “[l]egitimation techniques/tactics chosen will 
differ depending on whether the organisation is trying to gain or to extend legitimacy, to maintain 
its level of current legitimacy or to repair or to defend its lost or threatened legitimacy”. Chelli 
et al. (2014, p. 286) argue that within the strategic arm of legitimacy, “[o]rganisational stamina 
thus depends on the organisation's capacity to manage the demands of its environment, 
particularly those expressed by the groups that hold crucial resources for its survival”. 
Relationships with these ‘salient’ groups may change, along with company response behaviour, 
according to in which stage of legitimacy an organisation resides.  
 
Legitimacy is an “umbrella evaluation that, to some extent, transcends specific adverse acts 
or occurrences; thus, legitimacy is resilient to particular events, yet it is dependent on a history 
of events” (Suchman, 1995 p. 574). This definition is extended by Deephouse and Suchman 
(2008) by employing an in-depth, yet short summary of Suchman’s (1995) paper, quoting that 
“[l]egitimacy is not a commodity to be possessed or exchanged but a condition reflecting cultural 
alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules or laws” (Suchman, 1995 cited 
in Deephouse and Suchman, 2008 p. 51).  
 
Summarising the extant literature on legitimacy theory is challenging (Suchman, 1995), 
particularly because of the similar yet distinct strategic and institutional perspectives. 
Nonetheless, Suchman (1995 p. 599-601) discusses how both perspectives can be linked by 
understanding the pragmatic, moral and cognitive dimensions of gaining, maintaining and 
repairing legitimacy. Within these processes, direct action and external reporting can be 
harnessed depending on the desired ‘episodic’ or ‘continual’ legitimacy management outcome 
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sought (Suchman, 1995 p. 584). Further, the focus of legitimation efforts can be on actions 
wherein the organisation is “operating in a desirable, proper, and appropriate manner…” or 
essences where the organisation is “desirable, proper, and appropriate, in itself” (Suchman, 1995 
p. 583). This distinction between episodic and continual, and actions and essences, allowed for a 
more nuanced analysis of the way that certain actions and/or external reporting behaviours 
eventuated in our case study analysis.  
 
3.2 Stakeholder relationships 
Of particular importance, as part of the stakeholder system, is the ability to understand, prioritise 
and connect relationships and interdependencies (Neville et al., 2011; Donaldson and Preston, 
1995; Harrison and St. John, 1994). These connections can be understood in terms of a 
stakeholder network. Like nodes on a spider’s web, a stakeholder network ties an organisation to 
its stakeholders, and stakeholders to each other. Thus, stakeholders are not only connected to the 
organisation at the centre, but also to each other through a series of direct and/or indirect 
relationships. These interrelationships are particularly important to manage when stakeholders 
are physically, economically, socially, culturally or symbolically ‘close’ to an organisation. 
Stakeholder networks can be understood in terms of 1) alignment between stakeholders, 2) the 
strength and influence of the interactions between stakeholders and 3) synergies from unified 
action (Neville and Megnuc, 2006 p. 386-387) [5].  
 
Mitchell et al. (1997) introduced salience as consisting of three elements based on a particular 
stakeholder’s: 1) power, 2) legitimacy and 3) urgency. Power refers to the ability of stakeholders 
to impose their point of view on an organisation; legitimacy relates to the social acceptability and 
appropriateness of stakeholders’ actions; and finally, urgency concerns how time sensitive 
stakeholder demands are (Mitchell et al., 1997 pp. 865-868). Stakeholders may possess any 
permutation of the three attributes, allowing organisations to rank their claims according to risk. 
Stakeholders may also form networks to consolidate their ability to create a desired outcome in 
an organisation or its behaviour (Frooman, 1999; Bitektine and Haack, 2015). Thus, an adverse 
action to one stakeholder may quickly ‘activate’ other (directly or indirectly) affected 
stakeholders into action.  
 
3.3 Conceptual framework 
Understanding the nuanced theoretical work of Suchman (1995), Mitchell et al., (1997) and 
subsequent elaborations allows us to locate extant social and environmental reporting research 
and our own case study and analysis.  Reporting behaviour is arguably more preoccupied with 
developing ‘exchange legitimacy’ of the future expected value of a company’s operations, and 
to acquire a sense of ‘moral legitimacy’ where an organisation can justify its behaviour 
according to normative standards as ‘right’ (through positive stories of success) (see, for 
example, Higgins et al. 2015; Cho et al., 2015). Thus, reporting is being used as a symbolic 
gesture (Suchman, 1995) to portray legitimacy.  
 
Yet substantive gestures (Suchman, 1995) are also important to legitimacy. Substantive 
gestures, we suggest, are more readily portrayed through direct action with salient stakeholders. 
Direct action, such as non-reporting communication to appease a particular stakeholder group, 
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financial compensation, or sponsorship of philanthropic activities by organisations can be seen 
as ‘strategic’ exercises to aid in gaining, for instance, ‘dispositional legitimacy’, which revolves 
around judgements of ‘good character’ (Suchman, 1995).  
 
Understanding ‘legitimacy-as-process’ (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Suddaby et 
al. 2017) allows an organisation to become an ‘active’ player within a stakeholder network and 
enables a finer grained analysis of how various elements of legitimacy (such as pragmatic, moral 
and cognitive) may be established and reinforced by action and/or external reporting. A richer 
dynamic can be captured where firms can shift in legitimacy over time as they fall in or out of 
favour with the norms, values and expectations of salient stakeholders. For example, in times of 
adversity a firm may harness ‘dispositional legitimacy’ (where the audience evaluates the firm in 
a self-interested manner) and thus, favourably manipulate the judgments and actions of key 
stakeholders to protect its survival (Suchman, 1995 p. 579). Employees and shareholders may be 
advocates of the firm and contend that ‘it’s doing the best it can’ to support a wide range of 
socially valuable outcomes such as generating profits, employment, charitable works, etc. The 
community, on the other hand, may resist the organisation because of various issues such as harm 
that has been caused to the local environment. Legitimacy with some salient stakeholders may 
have migratory effects on others in the stakeholder network. When a firm is facing a ‘debated 
legitimacy’ status (Deephouse et al., 2017; Tilling and Tilt, 2010), this essentially means that 
potential threats to legitimacy may be shielded and external reporting may serve a minimal role 
in this process if substantive action can be more strategically used to curry favour.  
 
It is within this richer theoretical and more nuanced understanding of legitimacy-as-process that 
we seek to understand how an organisation that operates in an environmentally senstive industry 
manages its legitimacy both through the choice of reporting and non-reporting behaviours.  
   
4. Method 
An in-depth case study (Stake, 1995; Lee and Saunders, 2017) was conducted at the focal case 
company and involved considerable interaction with employees, senior managers and executives, 
and stakeholders from numerous site locations over nine months. Data collection was holistic 
with the primary researcher embedded in the context of the company’s operations with key 
staff. The case study can be considered emergent (Lee and Saunders, 2017) in that several issues 
that form the basis for in-depth analysis in this paper emerged during the course of the 
investigation. Analysis was interpretive (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2015) combining the 
primary researcher’s own insights into the research context from the time spent on site. These 
views were thoroughly discussed with the other researchers involved in the study to refine 
interpretations in an iterative process.  
 
Semi-structured interviews (26) took place with a range of staff from executive committee 
members through to front line employees. A semi-structured interview approach was chosen 
because it allowed the researcher flexibility and scope to explore new and emerging themes 
during the course of data collection (Barbour, 2008; Silverman, 2005). Questions were tailored 
to each employee depending on their position within the company. The interviewees are outlined 




[Insert Table 1 – Interviews at the company here] 
 
Approximately   half   of   these   interviews   were   recorded   on   digital   media   and 
professionally transcribed. Interview length ranged from 30 to 50 minutes. On instruction 
from the ‘organisational insider’ [6], the remaining interviews were not recorded so as to increase 
comfort to the participant and increase the truthfulness of the information gathered. During these 
interviews as many notes as possible were taken, both during and after the interview, to ensure 
answers were recorded to the fullest extent possible and to capture any extra observations or 
feelings (O’Dwyer, 2002; 2003). 
 
Site visits were conducted on several occasions to different operating sites of the organisation. 
Privileged access was also allowed to the Annual Environmental Seminar for all environmental 
employees, a stakeholder engagement meeting and internal company gatherings.  During  this  
time, detailed notes were taken of the primary researcher’s perceptions and feelings, together 
with any facts that seemed to standout at the time (Flick, 2006). Access was granted to 
confidential meeting agendas, reports and the company intranet only available to employees. A 
list of source documents used in the analysis is provided in Appendix A. These documents 
provided rich insights to further analyse and understand the operations of the case organisation 
(Marshall and Rossman, 2011). 
 
4.1 Data analysis 
Data consisted of information gathered from internal and external documents, interview 
transcripts and observations that the researcher made on field visits [7]. Annual external 
reports spanning 14 years, together with staff updates and customer newsletters were analysed. 
Analysis was a perpetual activity that happened throughout the field study period (O’Dwyer, 
2002). Notes and company documentary evidence were regularly reviewed (Bernard and Ryan, 
2009). Interviews were coded according to themes and motifs that emerged (Creswell, 2009; 
Bernard and Ryan, 2009). A similar process was applied to observations and document analysis 
where particular attention was placed on documenting internal processes, decision-making 
behaviours or communication with stakeholders. Data from internet sources and hard copy 
documents were read in detail to corroborate and extend themes emerging from interviews. 
Subsequently, interview transcripts were re-read.  Where possible, the original tapes were 
listened to again to ensure that the complexity of the real interview in terms of mood, 
emotions and accentuations were captured. Multiple quotations from a number of individuals, 
and other evidence, were gathered under each theme (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
 
Through this process, several illustrative events emerged from the data highlighting ‘vivid’ and 
‘clear’ examples (Gibson and Brown, 2009) of management decisions at four operating sites: 
Alpha, Beta, Charlie and Delta. While interview questions were not directly targeted at 
understanding these sites of operation, they emerged as key focal points to explain the 
interrelationships between the company and key stakeholders surrounding the sites. A 
stakeholder map was visually constructed together with the environmental issues at each site, the 
stakeholders concerned and their relative levels of salience as represented in interviewees’ 
dialogue (Grbich, 2006). Company actions and behaviours were also represented on this map, 
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including any oral or written communication (which was extremely limited) as reported in 
external reports.  
 
Drawing on the theoretical concepts discussed earlier, four scenarios regarding four operating 
sites are used to highlight the company’s response behaviours according to several factors: 1) 
visibility of the issue, 2) stakeholder salience, and 3) the interconnectedness of stakeholders 
around the problem.  
5. Case study organisation and legitimacy issues 
The case organisation is the New Zealand subsidiary of a large multinational company located  
across  tens  of  countries. The organisation (and the entire industry) is subject to extensive 
scrutiny given high greenhouse gas emissions in its supply chain and the possibility of 
environmental and aesthetic ‘harm’ in particular localities. The subsidiary is subject to regulatory 
review under New Zealand’s Resource Management Act (1991) under which stakeholders have 
a significant voice in debating (and opposing) the externalities of the company’s operations. A 
large, soon to be obsolete operating site in New Zealand has initiated debate over the company’s 
future in New Zealand. Potentially contested views of the company’s legitimacy and the size and 
shape of its operations place it in a ‘debated legitimacy’ context (Deephouse et al., 2017).  
 
The New Zealand subsidiary has been active for decades, and previously owned in New 
Zealand under varying names. It employs a large group of personnel across a diverse range of 
operating sites. It was held accountable by a global Headquarters. Each defined geographic area 
of the world was managed by a different Regional Director who reported to Headquarters. 
Regional Directors were held responsible on a range of different indicators including financial, 
production, environmental and health and safety goals. Further, they were also responsible for 
managing a portfolio of Managing Directors who run the subsidiary operations within a particular 
country. 
 
A reasonable amount of autonomy was allowed for the local (New Zealand) Board of Directors 
to govern operations as necessary in line with the parent company’s philosophy of ‘International 
benchmarks. National control’. However, the global CEO and their team made decisions that 
spanned the whole company’s strategic operations including large capital investment decisions 
in the individual sub-units of a country. This dynamic presented a novel case study of how an 
international company dealt with the pressure to satisfy global trends and requirements, 
pervasive legitimacy concerns as well as balance this with context specific realities related to 
each locality in New Zealand.  
 
An outline of the four operating sites, and each of three short-term issues and a long-term issue 
which emerged during the course of the case investigation and feature in the subsequent analysis 
are presented below. 
 
Alpha was a large facility located in a rural community surrounded by privately owned farms. 
Heavy machinery was usually in operation at the site, including a constant movement of large 
trucks and earthmoving equipment. Natural hills provided a significant degree of visual and 
auditory cover for operations. The facility was also home to a range of flora and fauna, including 
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a wetland. Access to the site was limited through one main access road. Two significant issues 
arose at Alpha. First, an ongoing technical fault regularly flooded a naturally bio-diverse area on 
company land with silt. Employees agreed the problem needed to be resolved but disagreed 
over i ts  severity. The company regularly exceeded its permit conditions with “unauthorised 
discharge”. The second issue concerned a neighbour’s farmland when a bund, or manmade earth 
barrier, eroded during a period of heavy rainfall. This led to water and other matter discharging 
onto the neighboring property, flooding a boundary section.  
 
Beta operated near a large residential and commercial precinct near a major city. It was in a 
highly visible location near a main street. Trucks and large vehicles frequently visited the site. 
Noise pollution and the chance of accidental material discharge were constant issues for the 
location. A significant issue occurred at Beta where a large spill of material that occurred on site 
enveloped houses and other businesses in the locality.  
 
Charlie was a major facility close to a township. It had become well integrated into the community 
as a large employer. However, the site’s useable life was coming to an end, necessitating an 
evaluation of options for the future operating capacity of the company. After considerable 
forecasting of future profitability, the company announced several possibilities for its continued 
operations and embarked on an extensive process of regulatory approval and community 
consultation for entering into a new Delta site in a different township. The long-term decision 
outcome was very important to the company and directly affected the nature of its operations and 
impact on communities. A considerable amount of money, time and other resources had gone into 
developing the proposal for the International Board, but also into preparing the New Zealand 
community where the new site may be based [8].  
6. Findings and Analysis 
6.1 Water overflow on company land (maintaining legitimacy) 
Water overflow at Alpha could lead to an infringement notice or a cessation order, but the key 
impediment to action was that the problem occurred within company-controlled land and was 
invisible to external stakeholders. One employee suggested that if the local council “came back 
on site today and saw that, they could either whack us with a huge fine or worst case scenario, 
tell us to stop operating and the fact that [even after] all these incidents [were logged in the 
company’s internal Issue Reporting System], it just doesn’t seem like its escalating enough” 
(Environmental Advisor 1).  
 
This was especially concerning to the environmental advisors since this would be the first time 
the operating site had been penalised. The line manager of the site (Site Manager 1), however, 
was adamant that “[t]he discharge was not a consent issue”, but did admit that “if we don’t find 
a solution we may have to close the facility during heavy rain”. Ultimately, the voice of an 
environmental advisor responsible for monitoring articulated an underlying concern, “[w]e’re 
not in danger of being shutdown [sic] by Council, but the more often that [name of employee] 
has to ring them and say, “[w]e’ve exceeded this or we’ve exceeded that, the more they are 




Several employees noted that the water discharge problem had been going on for years and that 
managers with authority were very slow and reluctant to make any changes. As there was little 
external pressure to resolve the issue, the problem became less urgent and could be internally 
managed at the discretion of employees (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1997). In this 
scenario, the local council (consent regulator) was the most salient outside stakeholder and 
possessed the attributes of power and legitimacy, although they did not have an urgent claim 
(Mitchell et al., 1997; Neville et al., 2011).  
 
Thus, action could be delayed because the limited visibility of the issue and the established 
good character or dispositional legitimacy of the company with the local council enabled 
them to mitigate potential “prying eyes” and investigation (Suchman, 1995 p. 578-579; see also, 
Puncheva, 2008). A staff member had “been extremely good and diligent in liaising with them 
[local council] about the whole thing and about letting them know where we are at any given 
time with it” (Environmental Advisor 1). While the local council could perform spot inspections, 
most reporting about adherence to permit conditions came from internal employees. Thus, 
employees could easily defend the company’s license to operate with tailored communications 
and leverage the strong dispositional legitimacy some staff had built with regulators to minimise 
the threat of extensive external monitoring.  
 
In this instance, then, legitimacy could be maintained at a ‘minimal cost’ to the company through 
this form of direct action. This sheds new light on the contradiction that O’Donovan (2002, p. 
359) discussed in relation to a less visible environmental incident. In O’Donovan’s paper, a 
vignette where the environmental impact was not known outside of the organisation was met 
with an apparently contradictory reactive response of ‘doing nothing’ or stalling, as well as a 
potentially proactive response in terms of openly spinning the issue into a positive story. Our 
study finds that both are possible where a ‘proactive’ strategy of managing stakeholders builds a 
cushion for the organisation to then act ‘reactively’ in actually resolving the environmental issue. 
 
Building close relationships between company employees and regulatory authority staff was seen 
as a crucial value-added exercise because of the spin-off effects from establishing a track-record 
of good character and a trustworthy disposition. Raising the scrutiny of regulators was dangerous 
to the company given the environmentally sensitive industry in which it operated. A line manager 
at Alpha (Site Manager 1) intimated that they had to work with council and, “be proactive with 
them before they catch you out” (see also, Prakash, 2000). Essentially, this kept the problem in-
house rather than inviting external scrutiny. The company was able to avoid immediate action 
because no ‘direct stakeholder’ was involved (Agle et al., 1999). Furthermore, as a regulatory 
authority, local councils had fewer network interdependencies which meant they were unlikely 
to divulge information to the media and escalate the situation unless a severe and wide-scale 
incident had occurred. The local council represented the ‘public’s interest’ with direct power to 
force the company to act (Neville and Megnuc, 2006). In this sense, the local council conferred 
‘legal legitimacy’ on behalf of other stakeholder concerns. If other stakeholders, such as close 
neighbours were involved, then there would be a greater propensity for these stakeholders to 
bring visibility and attention to the situation because they generally did not have direct power to 




In this scenario external reporting generated no important legitimacy benefits, and could in fact 
be negative by ‘disturbing the hornets’ nest’ and encouraging external scrutiny. The issue was a 
more localised problem centred on a small group of stakeholders and external disclosure could 
be detrimental to wider legitimacy with a wider array of constituents. The incident may activate 
other stakeholders into action if neighbours to Alpha (who possess legitimate claims though they 
do not have power or urgency in this case), for example, were alerted by way of external 
reporting of the incident and then formally complained to the local council. Acting through, and 
in conjunction with the local council would enable Alpha’s neighbours to gain power and 
increase their salience in relation to the company (Neville and Megnuc, 2006; Neville et al., 
2011). Furthermore, any obligatory environmental consent reporting for the Resource 
Management Act (1991) to the local council was regarded as specialised information and was 
rarely mentioned in public annual external reporting unless a breach had occurred. For instance, 
the 2007 external report from the company stated that an environmental infringement notice 
had been issued for an unauthorised discharge at one of its sites, but this was done within a 
table towards the end of the report (p. 30). No further information was provided on the nature 
of the incident or what actions had been put in place to remedy the issue. Maintaining pragmatic 
legitimacy by ‘stockpiling trust’ and highlighting its ‘good character’ as an essence of the 
organisation had helped to establish legitimacy on a continual basis (Suchman, 1995). 
 
6.2 Water nearly flooding neighbour’s land (repairing legitimacy) 
In the second issue at Alpha, an employee noted that action was taken immediately to resolve a 
problem: 
…there was another [water holding pond] that came that close to overflowing – didn’t endanger a 
[naturally bio-diverse area], it endangered a neighbour’s property - they complained about it.  All 
of a sudden we’ve got this brand new bund [earth mound] in place and it’s all fixed and I think 
that that was very much a case of keeping the neighbour happy, so that they did not – and that’s 
you know rightly or wrongly that was what happened, we did not want to upset the neighbour any 
more than we already had done by effectively threatening to flood her land (Environmental Advisor 
1) [9]. 
As noted earlier, the case company was a very visible target in the communities it operated in. 
Often, it was one of the biggest employers within a particular locality, therefore any incident 
could have wide ranging repercussions for the company. An issue that affected any of its close 
stakeholders was acted upon very quickly, especially because of the network interdependencies 
that exist between different stakeholder groups.  
 
The issue also potentially involved the local council and the rest of the community. The urgency 
of the need from a major stakeholder drove immediate action from the company regardless of 
cost (Mitchell and Agle, 1997; Mitchell et al., 1997). As staff at Alpha noted, unlike most other 
‘business decisions’, there was no prioritisation of decision variables or a detailed cost/benefit 
analysis. The neighbour had a strong voice when it came time for renewal of operating permits, 
thus preserving a good dispositional legitimacy with this stakeholder was vital to securing a 
future license to operate at the site (Suchman, 1995; Wilson, 2016). This mentality reflected the 
company’s propensity to “[r]eprioritise projects based on risks. Risk mitigation should be 
number one and costs shouldn’t come into it” (Environmental Advisor 1). Consequently, the 
company had to act in an ‘episodic’ effort to repair its legitimacy by demonstrating consequential 
moral legitimacy in ‘doing the right thing’ and in showing that the company pragmatically acted 
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in the ‘interest’ of the neighbour (Suchman, 1995 p. 584). This transitory and reactionary action 
was aimed at repairing the long-lasting good character that the company had fostered with some 
of the salient stakeholders surrounding Alpha. 
 
Increasing the threat to the company, neighbours had the ability to involve the media, local 
authorities, or incite community action against the company. Having previously demonstrated 
‘good character’ with the neighbours slowed escalatory action by giving the company a chance 
to rectify the problem (see also, Puncheva, 2008; Welcomer, 2002). A man-made earth barrier 
was quickly repaired, fencing restored and remedial action to restore the flooded part of the 
neighbours’ land was immediately undertaken. This was because improving relationships at a 
micro-level may be easier, and within the sphere of control of company personnel, rather than 
attempting to achieve broader and more complex socio-political legitimacy (Boutilier and 
Thomson, 2011). In a New Zealand context, these direct actions to maintain pragmatic 
legitimacy are important given the country’s small size and relatively close-knit nature 
increasing the likelihood of news spreading to other stakeholders such as communities at other 
company sites. Such escalation could affect the company’s overarching institutional legitimacy, 
especially as it came to a decision on a new future operating site in New Zealand as explained in 
section 6.4. 
 
As with the first water flooding event, external reporting did not feature any item about this 
incident. Again, while there is a greater commitment to action by the company, they considered 
the purpose of the behaviour to be around damage ‘containment’. It was not seen as necessary 
to externally report on the incident as this may spark legitimacy threats with other stakeholders 
that were ‘simmering’ and just needed a catalyst to materialise as a stronger problem (Durand 
and Vergne, 2015).  
6.3 Discharge over the community (repairing legitimacy) 
Although the spill at Beta was not necessarily the fault of the company (a contractor was to blame), 
the community immediately blamed the company. The incident was so widespread that the local 
council was immediately notified. Furthermore, the incident caught the attention of local and 
national media. The negative media attention and public anger forced actions to, in the words of 
the facility manager (Site Manager 2), “save our image”. It was a major incident for the company 
because of its public visibility, accentuated by the large area and number of households and 
businesses affected. Even to the present day, the site was considered a ‘hotspot’. 
 
Beta’s manager (Site Manager 2) acknowledged that the company’s “product is not ideal to 
maintain [a good] corporate image.” A repeated theme in the conversation with the manager 
was the ‘self-consciousness’ that some employees felt about the external image of the company, 
particularly in relation to the way external stakeholders viewed the firm. He recounted the gravity 
of the spill which required immediate remedial action to ensure that the community and 
regulatory response would not be even more hostile and detrimental to future operations at that 
locality. In the weeks following the spill, company staff implemented a number of initiatives, 
including voluntary help offered by company staff to clean affected houses and local businesses 
to win back community rapport. In line with this, Eesley and Lennox (2006, p. 779) find that 
indirect [10] (or secondary) stakeholder requests are “likely to be met by targeted firms when 
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stakeholder actions are taken by groups with greater power relative to the targeted firm and whose 
requests are more legitimate”.  
 
Furthermore, the business also had to undertake a considered and pervasive exercise, including 
through external communication, to minimise potential threats to its license to operate which 
ultimately affected the continual good character-based dispositional legitimacy it had created 
with the local council. The diversity of stakeholder demands in this situation showcased the 
strategic value of stakeholder engagement (Matos and Silvestre, 2013) with direct action, but 
also reporting in the company’s external report: 
we have had a crisis at [Beta Site] where a lot of [material] went all over [the community near 
Beta] and that was reflected in our annual report and we talked about what we did about it just in 
terms of a crisis (External Relations Manager) [11]. 
Thus, direct substantive action alone to repair dispositional legitimacy with the directly affected 
stakeholders involved would no longer suffice. Suchman (1995, p. 600) argues that pragmatic 
strategies to repairing legitimacy involve denial or monitoring. However, the community 
surrounding Beta and the local council possessed power, legitimacy and urgency. The 
widespread nature of the incident meant that the media were also informed and possessed 
considerable power through their ability to spread the news of the incident and mobilise a wider 
audience (see Durand and Vergne, 2015). Thus, by harnessing the claims of the salient 
stakeholders, the media was able to mobilise greater pressure on the company. As O’Donovan 
(2002 p. 362) points out, when repairing legitimacy in a highly visible situation, conforming to 
societal expectations and highlighting past environmental achievements are the most likely 
outcomes. Consequently, the severity of the issue required a humbler response which went 
beyond the self-interest of a particular audience to an understanding of action to restore ‘social 
welfare’ and wellbeing (Suchman, 1995 p. 579). 
 
This scenario is characterised by high issue visibility, and the involvement of sensitive 
stakeholders with a high interconnectedness to other stakeholder groups, and who hold a high 
degree of power (Mitchell et al., 1997; Mitchell and Agle, 1997). Media attention may 
exacerbate the reputation damage and activate ‘indirect’ stakeholders (Deephouse, 2000, p. 
1098; Driscoll and Crombie, 2001). The company launched a suite of direct actions through 
employee involvement in the community to restore its dispositional legitimacy with the affected 
stakeholder groups. Furthermore, to address the concerns of indirectly affected stakeholders, the 
company also released external media statements and external report communications. External 
media and external report communications disseminated a sense of appropriateness (Deephouse 
et al., 2017) of the extent of the company’s remedial activity to a larger and more public 
audience. In this sense, the external report was used to convey a sense of ‘moral legitimacy’ that, 
despite its failings, the company was ‘doing the right thing’ to repair legitimacy not just with 
‘close’ stakeholders, but with wider communities (Suchman, 1995 p. 600). Since this incident, 
the company has put in place a crisis response scheme to respond to the situation, learn from it 
and “a) report on it and b) put something in place so it doesn’t happen  again” (External 
Relations Manager). This also aligns with Suchman’s (1995, p. 600, 584) explanation that moral 
strategies to repair legitimacy include ‘revising practices’ and reconfiguring operations to 




6.4 Legitimacy and the future of the company (gaining legitimacy) 
The outcome of the long-term decision on moving to a new site would change the way the 
company operated in New Zealand. The company was image conscious in these interactions, 
given the environmentally sensitive nature of its operations. It was noted that a competitor had 
recently upgraded one of its own operating sites and had a superior array of capabilities. The 
pressure to keep pace with competition extended further than just to reach production and 
distribution parity but to also protect their external perception: “…it would be embarrassing if 
we were [operating the existing plant for the next 20 years]…it’s a bit of, you know, it’s an old 
crappy looking plant; it doesn’t look real sexy…” and further that “it’s an issue that in the future 
could affect the freedom with which we operate our business and therefore we need to mitigate 
that risk in some way.  We need to manage it and try and minimise our impact, so our license to 
operate is not affected in the future” (Environmental Advisor 2). 
 
In terms of climate change risks, the introduction of the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 
has been of great concern to the company. Its business is extremely energy and carbon intensive. 
There has been a significant interplay in both media, public and political forums about the 
consequences of such a scheme on the commercial viability of some firms. Indeed, the company 
understood that in its current form, the scheme leads to significant increases in production costs 
across the industry. This may have driven some large investment in competitors, and this bid to 
increase efficiency and reduce emissions also seems to be propelling a new look at the strategic 
options for the foreign affiliate.  Furthermore, demand was projected to grow leading to 
production bottlenecks at the current site, but also increasing emissions costs, and consequently, 
lowering profit margins. The Project Controller reiterated that the decision about the future of 
the business fundamentally came down to “ability to operate - a license to operate.  It’s quite 
simple really you’ve got to be able to operate a profitable business over at least 50 years and 
your [resources] have got to be good” and “dealing with production related issues to still be able 
to make an adequate margin on sales” (Project Controller). Thus, it is important to acknowledge 
that economic considerations underpinned any discussion of environmental factors. 
 
Company staff generally acknowledged the inherently unsustainable nature of their operations 
in terms of harnessing natural resources, but stated: “what we can do is be more sustainable than 
we are, we just use less irreplaceable resources than we are currently using – that would be my 
take on it” (Project Accountant). What is also inherently clear from top management is that 
‘sustainability’ means the financial viability of the company. Profit driven motives are not hidden 
and there is a sense that business ultimately means making a financial return:  
“Basically what it boils down to is doing the right thing and having a good profitable business and 
absolutely unashamedly we’re here to make money, but we’re also here to have a business that’s 
still operating profitably in 50 years’ time” (Group Manager - Environmental). 
This reflects findings from O’Dwyer (2003) that suggest managers interpret ‘good corporate 
citizenship’ against a backdrop of shareholder value maximisation. Ultimately, this gives weight 
to Suchman’s (1995 p. 588) undertaking that substantive efforts towards moral legitimacy may 
likely lead to goal displacement, which does not appear to be the case here. The company’s 
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‘debated’ legitimacy status, particularly as it attempted to gain consent for Delta, illustrated a 
challenging context within which it could gain legitimacy as the Managing Director explained in 
relation to the importance of sustainability for the company: 
 “So I think more and more this view of a license to operate comes to the fore and without doubt it’s 
more important when you’ve got a company that is within New Zealand which is a national based 
company… I mean we’re from one from end of the country to the other.  When you’re using raw 
materials and whilst we are not a huge company by employee standards we do affect lots of 
communities positively I hope...[and] there is increased scrutiny on companies and that just needs 
to be kept in balance…” (Managing Director). 
The long-term strategic decision to invest in Delta involved more concern over the symbolic 
moral and cognitive dimensions of the legitimacy of the company, rather than the pragmatic 
strategies for gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy discussed above where: 
“Improved reputation, improved trust with business partners and with the communities that you’re 
working right beside, gives you the license to operate.  And by that I mean if you’re in a [description 
of environmentally sensitive operating site] and you have a community that trusts you as an 
organisation - trusts you to do the right thing if there are problems and not walk all over them, and 
sometimes in some of our businesses we require our neighbours to sign off on consents, change of 
hours – things like that and that is what I mean by they enable sometimes our license to operate and 
make changes” (Project Controller). 
In this sense, the interviewee is suggesting that dispositional legitimacy helps encourage 
stakeholders to engage directly with the company rather than through a third party, such as the 
media. By attempting to enter an entirely new community and invest in Delta in a different part 
of New Zealand, however, this previous track-record cannot be established with substantive 
action in intimate stakeholder relationships as occurred in the short-term scenarios. As Suchman 
(1995, p. 588) notes, “organizations seeking to gain pragmatic legitimacy rarely can rely on 
purely dispositional appeals, because assumptions of good character generally require an 
established record of consistent performance”.  
 
Instead, gaining a basic license to operate in the new context relied more heavily on symbolic 
gestures to illustrate a more broad-brush institutional legitimacy or a conformance to social 
norms, customs and behaviours. To do so, all forms of pragmatic, moral and cognitive 
legitimation are targeted through a suite of communication processes. Thus, the response to the 
long-term issue is more symbolic and subtle than substantive and overt. Direct action has a 
limited place in this setting where there are no ‘direct’ stakeholders because the issue is so wide 
and encompassing. As the company does not have a site in this community, it cannot fortify itself 
with a previous track-record of dispositional legitimacy with direct stakeholders. Instead, it must 
rely on an overarching sense of legitimacy in New Zealand, enabled through the use a suite of 
communication tools. 
 
Communication about the long-term decision-making process to build a new site was mainly 
distributed through targeted newsletters delivered to approximately 8,000 important stakeholders 
in the surrounding community and nationally. The company held community consultation 
meetings to raise its profile and settle concerns from stakeholders. Indeed, this was the preferred 
mode for delivering information about the strategic investment decision that was about to be 
made. During the initial 40-day public submission period of the environmental consent process 
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required under the Resource Management Act (1991), the company opened an “Information 
Centre” in the community staffed for a day a week. A media release quoted the Manager of 
Strategy and Development as stating “ongoing direct and indirect economic benefits, including 
between 110 and 125 direct long-term jobs (worth around $8 million a year in wages) and a 
further 80 to 120 jobs (worth another $4-5 million a year) in professional, technical, 
maintenance and production vocations” (Company Media Disclosure, 2006). In this sense, 
‘exchange legitimacy’ in the future expected benefits to the surrounding stakeholders were 
emphasised. A new site would also mean upgrades to the infrastructure and increased economic 
prosperity for the ‘new’ local council. Potential negative implications were downplayed if 
possible, even in subtle ways. For instance, the environmental effects study of Delta consisted of 
four volumes, but only received a limited circulation with no copies available online. One 
hardcopy was placed in the local community library. Where possible, personal interaction with 
the community was preferred to allay concerns about the proposed project.  
 
Nonetheless, the Project Controller noted how the submission process was a heated and long-
drawn affair due to the significant volume of submissions received from stakeholders, both in 
favour and opposed. Eventually, the submission process required formal Environmental Court 
proceedings to arbitrate, with local stakeholders, including Maori community groups, arguing 
the cultural and heritage value of the site and the potential disruption caused with large-scale 
development of the area. Following the Environmental Court’s decision in favour of the 
company’s proposal in 2009, local newspapers detailed the disappointment of Maori 
communities and surrounding neighbours because of traffic from increased trucking, amongst a 
number of other issues.  
 
Despite the protracted engagement with the community and Environmental Court deliberation, 
during this time, disclosures in annual external reports were very limited. All external report 
disclosures about the new proposed plant at Delta during the four-year period it took to gain 
consent were benign descriptions of the process that the company was undertaking with an 
emphasis on financial impacts of the decision for shareholders. Discussions of the long-term 
operating decision were limited to one page of text and one photograph of the proposed site in 
2006 for instance. Nonetheless, there were detailed accounts of the philanthropic and community 
based activities that the organisation was undertaking across New Zealand to underscore its 
moral legitimacy in efforts towards maintaining community well-being (Suchman, 1995 p. 600). 
The explanation of these community initiatives in the 2006 report consisted of three full pages 
including multiple photographs of staff involvement at ‘World Cleanup Day’ and the funding 
given to various primary school projects.  
 
6.4.1 Role of external reporting 
Specifically in terms of the purpose of annual external reports, the Managing Director noted that 
“not everything we report is positive and so there’s always room for improvement...” and further 
“we think we do things well and we like to let others know that we’re doing that… It’s a 
document that goes to a wide base of our stakeholders”. The annual triple bottom line report 
was a way to capture and disseminate the positive stories about the company to a wide 
audience. The Company Chairman in the 2003 report noted that it was “once again an 
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opportunity to show examples of the firm commitment of [name of company] to 
sustainable development” (p. 4). Only on one occasion in the 2005 report, was there a 
disclosure of an environmental infringement, however there were no specific details of the nature 
of the incident or remedial action around the problem. This view was supported by the External 
Relations Manager who explained that,  
“our parent company [has] become very aware of, you know, one bad incident that has a very 
wide impact and you’re always working to get the positives out there rather than staying quiet and 
then trying to defend yourself when something goes wrong”(External Relations Manager).  
Furthermore, the visibility of the company is important: “because you might say we’re a big dirty 
industry and so we have to show that we’re very conscious of the way that we operate and we try 
to do it in the best way possible way.  It really becomes our license to operate” and 
communications in the triple bottom line report are “about building up a track record of positive 
things knowing that there are also a lot of negatives out there and people have only got to do a 
web search” (External Relations Manager). Indeed, an Environmental Advisor was even more 
candid about the tension between image and reality: 
“I often wonder at times if it’s just a front you know to make the company look good.  I mean every 
other company’s the same; you look at our competitor like [name of competitor] and you look on 
their internet pages and you know it’s all, we’re doing this, that and other – it’s wonderful for the 
environment and we’re planting here, planting there…from what they say they do to what they 
actually do, to me there’s like a huge gap there and yeah, I hate saying it, but I can’t help think that 
it’s just some sort of front that just makes the company look good to be honest” (Environmental 
Advisor 1). 
Providing positive disclosures potentially mitigates the damage of negative shocks (Milne and 
Patten, 2002). This aligns well with recent findings from Higgins et al. (2015) who conducted a 
large survey of Australian companies’ reporting practices and showed that 88 percent of 
companies expected external reporting to improve or manage their reputations. Suchman’s 
(1995, p. 595) strategies for maintaining legitimacy suggest “that organizations can enhance their 
security by converting legitimacy from episodic to continual form and this can be achieved in 
part through “developing a defensive stockpile of supportive beliefs, attitudes, and accounts”. 
 
Visible signalling of legitimacy was important given that the long-term strategic decision about 
the future of the company’s operations attracted significant media and public attention. A 
decision of this scale has far-reaching impacts for the company, the local communities in which 
it operates, and the jobs that are at stake. However, the specialised nature of the project, requiring 
careful communication with various stakeholder groups at the most preferred option site, meant 
annual external reports only provided general information about the company. The 
communications about the long-term decision were far more catered and specific to the 
information needs of the stakeholders affected. Much of that catered disclosure, however, was 
necessary as part of receiving Environmental Court approval and regulatory consent. The 
regulatory process ensured that there was adequate dialogue between the company and its 
stakeholders, and that there were public forums in place to air any concerns.  
20 
 
7. Discussion  
The preceding vignettes highlight the complexity of legitimacy management and how 
understandings of legitimacy in accounting need to shift from narrow examinations of external 
report disclosures towards deeper fuller explorations of internal ‘thinking’, processes and 
behaviours of firms (Adams, 2008; Dumay et al., 2015). The first two issues illustrate how direct 
action with salient stakeholders are strategically used to manipulate relationships in order to 
maintain organisational legitimacy. This is demonstrated where the company was able to keep 
regulators at an arm’s length because of the strong relationship key internal staff had built with 
monitoring officials. Thus, a potential breach at Alpha which may have affected its license to 
operate was shielded from external scrutiny by managing salient stakeholders close to the site, 
allowing the company to remedy the issue at its own pace.  
 
The second issue involved a more immediate threat to the organisation’s legitimacy. In efforts to 
quickly contain the threat, there was immediate remedial action by the company despite any 
financial cost. This meant that the company could protect, if not enhance, its dispositional 
legitimacy with neighbours by showing diligence, concern and responsive action. Action to 
preserve its image of good character with neighbours was critically important. Over time, these 
discrete episodic actions to curry favour with neighbours could lead to a more ‘continual’ sense 
of legitimacy being endowed through the company being perceived in ‘essence’ as of good 
character (Suchman, 1995 p. 584). Thus, these intimate relationship-building exercises in 
response to environmental incidents allow, over time, the company to enhance a holistically 
perceived and institutionally defined (Suchman, 1995) sense of organisational legitimacy (Arora-
Panchal and Lodhia, 2016).  
 
Importantly, in these two issues, dispositional legitimacy with neighbours was a strategic asset 
in protecting the company from undesired oversight from regulators. The good character built 
with neighbours created more positive perceptions of the company which may have then 
countered the negative perceptions of other stakeholders. This process was particularly important 
given the ‘debated legitimacy’ of the company where continued operations in an environmentally 
sensitive industry were questioned (Deephouse et al., 2017). In this way, the company was able 
to manage pragmatic legitimacy with salient stakeholders in order to avoid losing its license to 
operate in those localities. Over time, this may have helped support the perception that the 
company was conforming to social norms, customs and behaviours (Deegan, 2002), thus 
supporting an institutional sense of legitimacy. This institutional sense of legitimacy is important, 
because as we contend, strategic legitimacy is typically localised and does not have the same 
migratory effects to other localities such as the potential new site Delta.  
 
Threats to the organisation’s legitimacy were most visible in our third issue. Here, the issue was 
so pervasive that managing pragmatic legitimacy with a few key stakeholders was not possible. 
The overarching legitimacy of the company was threatened because so many stakeholders were 
mobilised to question the company’s license to operate and its ability to continue operating 
without causing harm in multiple localities (Wilson, 2016). The interconnectedness of 
stakeholders exacerbated the intensity of pressure placed on the case company. This scenario is 
the only instance where external reporting, as well as direct action from the company, was felt to 
be justified. With dispositional legitimacy with surrounding stakeholders now questioned, the 
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company was no longer protected from wider scrutiny from indirect (and potentially salient) 
stakeholders. Consequently, influencing the perception of the company required action as well 
as reporting to reach a wider audience. These disclosures were needed to demonstrate exchange 
legitimacy in the sense that the company was a valuable contributor to the community but also 
to buttress its now diminished sense of institutional legitimacy to a broad group of stakeholders.  
 
We see a similar emphasis on external reporting rather than direct action in the long-term issue 
which required the influence of a wide and disparate audience, with whom a track-record of good 
behaviour was not yet established. The company attempted to produce stories of positive 
engagement within particular localities to build a picture of its dispositional legitimacy, or ‘good 
character’. Attempts at showcasing exchange legitimacy were displayed in the external reporting 
narrative the company produced about the direct and indirect benefits it would provide 
surrounding localities at Delta. 
  
Table 2 summarises response strategies for the company in terms of the short-term and long-
term issues analysed. These response strategies extend O’Donovan’s (2002 p. 363) legitimation 
tactic/disclosure matrix exploring the legitimation pressures faced by organisations according to 
three characteristics which are used to describe each scenario: 1) visibility of the issue, 2) 
stakeholder salience, and 3) interconnectedness of stakeholders based on the stakeholder network 
introduced in this paper.  
 
[Insert Table 2 – Response schema here] 
 
Our case study and its vignettes illustrate the dynamics explained earlier to elucidate how 
response behavior, either through direct non-reporting action and/or reporting, changes according 
to the unique context of each environmental incident. In doing so, this paper responds to Adams’ 
(2008) calls for a more contextual and case-based understanding of reporting and non-reporting 
behaviour. Along with Dumay et al., 2015, it extends Suchman’s (1995) work on the elements of 
legitimacy by discussing how these concepts can be usefully distinguished to explain company 
response behaviour.  
 
We illustrate how issue visibility, stakeholder salience and stakeholder interconnectedness 
influence company behaviour regarding whether to adopt direct action and/or reporting to manage 
legitimacy. If the issue is highly visible, then the company may be forced to act. However, this is 
only if salient stakeholders are also affected by the incident in the first instance. If not, then the 
company can potentially delay action or reporting, unless affected stakeholders have a high level 
of interconnectedness with other, more salient, stakeholders. In this case, acting in unison with 
these more salient stakeholders, less salient stakeholders may be able to increase pressure on the 
company to respond with immediate direct action. Consequently, this may draw out a wider 
reporting response if the issue could potentially threaten its overarching organisational legitimacy. 
If less salient stakeholders are not able to use their network to supplement a missing salience 
characteristic of their own (e.g. legitimacy or power), then the company may be in a position to 
resolve the issue at their own pace and minimise any costs of action. In such a scenario, strategic 
drivers for external report disclosure are minimal because they do not serve any pragmatic purpose 




If visibility of an issue is low, then the company may again postpone action to remedy the situation 
to suit its own convenience and minimise costs. This is unless the need to maintain legitimacy 
with high salience stakeholders persuades the company into either genuinely, or symbolically, 
acting. In this context, action may be immediate and at all cost (more likely if there is ‘genuine’ 
environmental concern) or somewhat more measured in approach if it is a symbolic attempt to 
build or stockpile legitimacy with a particular stakeholder(s) in case of future negative incidents 
(Suchman, 1995 p. 600). Such actions are unlikely to feature in external reporting, unless the issue 
poses a minimal threat to the company’s image so such disclosure would not affect it. Here, 
strategic reporting of the incident can be used as a tool to bolster the dispositional legitimacy of 
the company with its ‘close stakeholders’ and present a glossier image of itself to a wider array 
of stakeholders. Similarly, the necessity to communicate broadly to diverse stakeholder groups 
showed how external reporting created ‘positive stories’ to signal exchange, dispositional and 
moral legitimacy, assuring conformance with broader social norms and customs.  
 
In essence, the case vignettes highlight how efforts to manage strategic legitimacy are more 
‘episodic’, based on intimate interactions with close stakeholders to preserve ‘good character’ and 
secure the company’s license to operate in a particular locality. Episodic interventions to manage 
strategic legitimacy, over time, enabled the company to build its institutional legitimacy as an 
actor that conformed to wider societal norms, customs and behaviours. In reinforcing its 
‘continual’ conformance to these standards, external reporting created a narrative about how the 
company was actively a part of the communities it worked in. These efforts, in tandem with other 
external communication tools and rapport building, sought to establish and secure a license to 
operate for the company with a wider group of stakeholders in its efforts to build a new production 
facility in the longer term. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This study has shown how a company chooses to report or not to report on several short and 
long-term environmental issues. Thus, the study builds on recent literature, developing an 
important distinction between legitimacy enhancing actions and legitimating reporting actions. 
In particular, the novel empirical setting of a large company operating in an environmentally 
sensitive industry illustrates how direct actions to gain, maintain and repair legitimacy with 
stakeholders should be distinguished from external reporting as a tool to manage legitimacy. 
The choice over whether direct action or external reporting should be used in organisational 
attempts to manage legitimacy is affected by the visibility of the issue, the salience of the 
stakeholders involved and the stakeholder networks affected.  
 
This study provides a number of additions to the current literature. First, the study is motivated 
by the movement towards unpacking and illuminating the decision-making behaviours which 
lead up to external social and environmental reporting. Thus, it adds further empirical insight by 
exploring the practice of social and environmental accounting and accountability within 
companies operating in environmentally sensitive environments (Parker, 2014).  
 
Second, while a number of recent studies have contributed to understanding the role of reporting 
in the legitimation behaviour of organisations (see, for example, Conway et al. 2015; Belal and 
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Owen, 2015; Kent and Zunker, 2013), the present study provides a comprehensive and integrated 
application of the different elements of legitimacy theory (Suchman, 1995). In particular, the 
analysis shows how pragmatic legitimacy is harnessed via direct action with salient stakeholders. 
Attempts to manage moral and cognitive legitimacy possess more limited roles, except via 
narrative claims made through external reporting.  
 
Third, this study explains a framework linking the strategic and institutional arms of legitimacy 
theory (Mobus, 2005; Dumay et al., 2015) via direct action and external reporting, thus linking 
episodic interventions with continual efforts to manage legitimacy. That is, insights from this 
paper extend our understanding of Suchman’s (1995) discussion of organisational legitimacy, 
showcasing how episodic efforts to manage strategic legitimacy with direct action can, over time, 
enable an organisation to secure its institutional legitimacy in terms of conformance to social 
norms, customs and behaviours. This advances a more nuanced role and framework for 
legitimacy theory explanations into organisational behaviour (see, for example, Belal and Owen, 
2015). Consequently, this research introduces a framework for examining company response 
behaviour to environmental issues using legitimacy theory and stakeholder salience that moves 
beyond previous work that simply links external reporting with legitimation strategies.  
 
Fourth, this study provides theoretical and practical contributions by furnishing a model for 
companies to understand the environmental risks of particular short and long-term environmental 
issues and determine appropriate response strategies for engaging with salient stakeholders. 
Although this may seem to encourage ‘instrumental stakeholder management’ (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995), we contend that greater self-awareness of the impacts of corporate activity is 
crucial to later achieving meaningful, transparent and accountable stakeholder interactions.  
 
Overall, this research links a number of theoretical perspectives to explore decision-making 
behaviour. Further valuable insights can be drawn from additional research using case studies 
that explore and understand the salience of stakeholders, their interconnectedness and firm 
behaviour around legitimacy management and the contingency of external communication 
strategies including formal reporting. In particular, future contributions can be made by 
understanding how legitimacy management strategies (both actions and external reporting) with 
salient stakeholders feature in industries where legitimacy is not ‘debated’, but is ‘taken-for-
granted’, ‘proper’ or ‘illegitimate’ (Deephouse et al., 2017). More specifically, further research 
illustrating the intricate aspects of how legitimacy is built, managed and repaired with salient 
stakeholders to navigate overarching organisational legitimacy is warranted. Ultimately, the 
framework introduced in this paper sets a foundation for future research to more coherently 
understand company behaviours, both direct and substantive, as well as symbolic communication 







[1] As will be discussed later in this paper, the case company of this study operates in and around the 
‘tipping point’ due to its environmentally sensitive operations. 
 
[2] Within the mining and minerals extraction industry, of which our case organisation sits, it is 
increasingly common for reference to be made to the organisation’s ‘social license to operate’ (Joyce and 
Thomson, 2000; Prno and Slocombe, 2012; Parsons et al., 2014). As Prno and Slocombe (2012, p. 346) 
articulate, “[f]ull legal compliance with state environmental regulations has thus become an increasingly 
insufficient means of satisfying society’s expectations with regards to mining issues”.  
 
[3] It is important to note that more recent literature argues that strategic and institutional approaches to 
legitimacy are not necessarily separate but often affect organisations in tandem (Chelli et al., 2014). 
 
[4] Diverging from our synthesis, it must be noted that Deegan (2014), in providing a broad overview of 
legitimacy theory, also makes reference to legitimacy as a resource necessary for survival which firms 
can influence through disclosure strategies (p. 249).  
 
[5] Neville and Menguc (2006) more specifically refer to the notion of stakeholder networks. 
 
[6] This was a key company contact who saw the value of the research project conducted and supported 
the researcher in gaining access to different elements of the company. 
 
[7] Over 70,000 words were transcribed from the 14 tape recorded interviews. Field notes were taken 
during non-recorded interviews and amounted to more than 20,000 words. Annual external reports 
spanning 14 years, together with company sales brochures, staff updates and customer newsletters were 
analysed. 
 
[8] The Resource Management Act (1991) [cited as New Zealand Government (1991) in the references] 
is the main legislation governing how the environment should be managed in New Zealand. It sets out 
planning and consent processes that determine who and how natural resources can be used and under what 
conditions. 
 
[9] Some parts of this quote and the role of the employee have been edited to ensure the anonymity of 
the respondent. The interview recording was carefully scrutinised and words chosen carefully to 
maintain the essence of what the respondent was stating. 
 
[10] Eesley and Lenox (2006) define a secondary stakeholder as those who do not have a formal 
contract with a company or a direct legal authority over a firm (p. 765). 
 
[11] This quote was edited to ensure the anonymity of the case study site. The transcript was carefully 




Appendix A: Source Documents 
Annual reports and reviews (14 consecutive reports 1996-2009). 
• Global Parent’s Corporate Sustainable Development Reports. (biennial reports 2005, 2007, 
2009). 
• New Zealand subsidiary’s Annual Reviews (2002-2009 – the first of these was titled A 
second approach to Triple Bottom Line Reporting). 
• New Zealand Limited Social, environmental, economic: A first approach to Triple Bottom 
Line Reporting (2001). 
• New Zealand Limited Annual Review (1999, 2000).  
• New Zealand Limited Annual Report (1996-1998).  
 
Project Information Sheets (15 information sheets). 
• Consultation Process (Information Sheet 1). July 2006. 
• Supply options project: Delta option (Information Sheet 2). July 2006. 
• Supply options project: Construction (Information Sheet 3). August 2006. 
• Supply options project: Noise (Information Sheet 4). August 2006. 
• Supply options project: Transport (Information Sheet 5). August 2006. 
• Supply options project: Air (Information Sheet 6). September 2006. 
• Supply options project: Ecology (Information Sheet 7). September 2006. 
• Supply options project: Delta Option Quarries (Information Sheet 8). October 2006. 
• Supply options project: Frequently asked questions (Information Sheet 9). Nov 
2006. 
• Supply options project: Delta Option Servicing (Information Sheet 10). Dec 2006. 
• Supply options project: Social, cultural & historical impact assessment (Information 
Sheet 11). Dec. 2006. 
• Supply options project: Air Update (Information Sheet 12). Feb 2007.  
• Supply options project: Plant Photomontages (Information Sheet 13). Feb 2007  
• Supply options project: Delta sand pit (Information Sheet 14). March 2007.  
• Supply options project: Delta coal pit (Information Sheet 15). March 2007.  
 
Community Newsletters (26 newsletters May 2006 to May 2010). 
These covered a variety of topics related to the major long-term investment project 
including: 
• XX continues to investigate future growth options 
• XX begins consulting with communities. 
• Good feedback from Information Open Day. 
• Answers to your questions. 
• If you want economic benefits and jobs – you have your say!  
• Project will bring big wins to district  
• How to make a submission  
• Community support welcomed. 
• Submissions are important  
• Hearing is now the focus 
• Consent decision received 
• XXX– A fundamental element for a modern, developed economy  
• Environmental court hearing  
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Table 1: List of interviews conducted at the company. 
 
Interviews at the company 
 Title Role 
 Senior Leadership  
1 Managing Director Executive Team 
2 Chief Financial Officer Executive Team/Financial 
3 Human Resources Manager Executive Team 
4 Project Controller Senior Management 
5 External Relations Manager Senior Management 
6 Group Manager – Environmental Senior Management 
7 Sustainability Manager Senior Management 
8 Group Environmental Advisor Middle Management 
9 Health, Safety and Environment Officer 1 Business Unit Advisor 
10 Health, Safety and Environment Officer 2 Business Unit Advisor 
11 Environmental Advisor – 1 Facility Advisor 
12 Environmental Advisor – 2 Facility Advisor 
13 Operations Manager Business Unit Manager 
14 Distribution Manager Regional coordinator 
15 Distribution Coordinator Regional coordinator 
16 Distribution Worker Regional 
17 Project Accountant Financial 
18 National Sales Manager Senior Management 
19 Sales Manager Business Unit Manager 
 Operations  
20 Acting Site Manager Business Unit Manager 
21 Site Manager – 1 Business Unit Manager 
22 Site Manager – 2 Business Unit Manager 
23 Site Manager – 3 Business Unit Manager 
24 Acting Technical Manager – Operating site Facility Advisor 
 Informal talks  
25 Driver Facility level 







Table 2: Response schema 
 





















High Local council does 
not rely on network 
to increase salience 
Avoidance behavior 
and delay till less 














High High Neighbour can 
escalate easily to 
surrounding 
community and the 




action regardless of 





















and scrutiny on 
company’s actions 
Direct and immediate 
action regardless of 
cost. Substantial 
external reporting 









High High High 
interconnectedness 
of stakeholders. 
Direct and indirect 
stakeholders are 
engaged due to the 
pervasive nature of 
the issue 
Direct action through 
increased visibility in 







newsletters and the 
media 
 
 
 
 
